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A Nonmonotonic  Conditional 
Logic for Belief Revision 
Part 1: Semantics and Logic of Simple Conditionals 
Hans  Rott* 
Abstract  
Using G£rdenfors's notion of epistemic entrenchment, wedevelop the 
semantics of a logic which accounts for the following points. It explains 
why we may generally infer If -~A then B if all we know is AVB while 
must not generally infer If -~A then B if a~ we know is {AVB,A}. More 
generally, it explains the nonmonotonic nature of the consequence r - 
lation governing languages which contain conditionals, and it explains 
how we can deduce conditionals from premise sets without condition- 
als. Depending on the language at hand, our logic provides different 
ways of keeping the Kamsey test and getting round the G£rdenfors 
triviality theorem. We indicate that consistent additions of new items 
of belief are not to be performed by transitions to logical expansions. 
1 In t roduct ion  
1.1 An example 
Imagine that you are walking along a long and lonely beach. It is a beautiful 
night. Still you feel somewhat uncomfortable. You are hungry. But you know 
that at the end of the beach there are two restaurants, one of them run 
*University of Stuttgart, Institute for Computational Linguistics, Keplerstrat3e 17, 
D-7000 Stuttgart 1, West Germany 
136 
by Annie, the other one by Ben. There are no other buildings around. Now 
you are still far away from the restaurants, but you happen to perceive a 
shimmering light there, without being able to make out whether it comes 
from Annie's or Ben's restaurant. So you form the belief that either Annie's 
or Ben's restaurant isopen. And also, you are willing to accept he conditional 
If Annie's restaurant is not open (then) Ben's restaurant will be open. 
(1) 
Approaching the promising end of the beach, you see that Annie's restaurant 
is lit while Ben's is unlit. You form the new beliefs that Annie's but not Ben's 
restaurant is open. You have just learned something new, nothing causes any 
contradiction. But surprisingly ou have lost the conditional (1). You no 
longer believe that if Annie's restaurant is not open then Ben's restaurant 
will be open, nor do you assent o the (more appropriate) subjunctive variant 
If Annie's restaurant were not open (then) Ben's restaurant would 
be open. (2) 
Put in more formal terms, the premise of your belief state in the first situation 
may be taken to be AVB. Later on you add new pieces of information, viz., 
A and ~B. Representing the natural anguage conditional ' i f . . .  then ...  ' by 
the formal connective o--~, we find that you can infer -~A~-+B at the outset 
of your beach walk, but that you cannot infer -~A[::I--+B after spotting the 
light source in Annie's restaurant: 
-~ACb-*B e Cn({AVB}), but 
-~A~-~B 6 Cn({AVB,A,-~B}) 
(or ~AD--~B 6 Cn({AVB,A&-~B})). 
Conditionals thus exhibit a non-monotonic behaviour. That is, in the con- 
text of a language which contains conditionals, we cannot expect to have 
a plausible consequence r lation Cn such that PCP ~ automatically implies 
Cn(P)CCn(F'). This is my first point. My second one is that Cn should in- 
clude some kind of conditional logic. In the initial situation, it appears quite 
correct to infer the natural anguage conditional (1) (not just the material 
conditional -~A--~B!) from the premises in which no conditional connective 
occurs ,  
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Notice that it seems very natural  to switch from considering an indicative 
to considering the corresponding subjunctive conditional in this example. 1 
We will in fact presuppose in this paper that, roughly, both types of condi- 
tionals are susceptible to a unified account employing the so-called Ramsey 
test: 2 
(R) AD--*B is accepted in a belief state if and only if updat ing this belief 
state so as to accomodate A leads to a belief state where B is accepted. 
1.2 The role of consequence relations in G irdenfors s 
incompatibi l ity theorem 
The points just made in the intuitive example have a counterpart in a mean- 
while notorious abstract result. G~rdenfors (1986; see G£rdenfors 1988, Sec- 
tions 7.4-7.7) has shown that the Ramsey test is incompatible with a small 
number of apparently innocuous and reasonable requirements for updat ing 
belief states. The most important one is the preservation principle: 
(P) If a sentence A is consistent with a belief state then updating this belief 
state so as to add A leads to a belief state which includes all sentences 
accepted in the original belief state. 3
Leaving aside technical niceties, all proofs for the Ggrdenfors incompatibi l ity 
theorem that can be found in the l iterature run like this. Start with a belief 
1The example is a variation of an example to be found in Hansson (1989). The crucial 
difference from Hansson's hamburger example is that in my case spotting the light in 
Annie's restaurant completely overrides the earlier piece of information that Annie's or 
Ben's restaurant is lit. In this way my example is also meant to refute the suggestion 
of Morreau (1.990) that the evaluation of conditionals always depends on the order of 
incoming information. Morreau's analysis predicts, wrongly I believe, that conditionals 
cannot be lost after consistent updates of belief states. See Rott (1990). 
2Since Adams published his famous Kennedy example, most writers have refrained from 
venturing a unified analysis of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. I think, however, 
that the principle of compositionality should be applied here. If there are differences in 
meaning between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, they should be attributed to 
the different grammatical moods and/or tenses rather than to the connective 'if' itself. 
3(R) and (P) could be weakened by requiring that A and B be "objective sentences", 
i.e., non-conditionals. This would not make a difference for the following. However, while I
reject (P), I shall accept a modified form of the preservation principle saying that objeciive 
sentences are preserved under consistent updates. 
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state K that is totally ignorant with respect o two sentences A and B. Let 
K ~ and K" be the belief states that are obtained after adding A and B to K, 
respectively. Now the preservation principle says that adding -~(A&=B) to K' 
and K" will not throw out A and B from K I and K", respectively. Applying 
the Ramsey test, this gives that ~(A&:B)~--~A is in K' and -~(A&B)D--~B is 
in K". Now consider K ~" which is the resulting belief state after adding A 
and B (or after adding A&B) to K. It is usually stipulated or just taken for 
granted that K "t is a superset of both K' and K'. Hence both -~(A&B)t=I--*A 
and -~(A&B)t::~B are in K", hence, by another application of the Ramsey 
test, A and B are in the update of K ~" which is necessary in order to acco- 
modate -~(A~zB). But of course, -~(A&B) should be in this update as well. 
So this update is inconsistent, in contradiction to a quite modest principle 
of consistency maintenance. 
The reader will already have guessed the point where I do not agree. It is 
the stipulation that K "~ be a superset of K' and K s. Actually, most writers 
identify consistent additions of beliefs with logical expansions: 
K 1 = Cn(KU{ A }) 
K"= Cn(KU{B}) 
K"  = Cn(KU{A,B }) 
(or K"= Cn(KU{A&B})). 
It follows that K "~ is a superset of both K' and K", if one can presuppose 
that Cn is monotonic, or respectively, if it satisfies the similar, slightly weaker 
principle of classical monotonicity: if Cn0(r)cCn0(r') then cn(r)ccn(r'). 
But we saw in the introductory example that neither monotonicity nor clas- 
sical monotonicity is warranted in languages containing conditionals. 
Another way to make precise the intuitive idea behind the proofs of the 
Ggzdenfors incompatibility theorem is to keep the expansion idea for K ~ and 
K" but to identify K"  with Cn(K'U{B}) and Cn(K"U{A}). This would guar- 
antee that K "~ is a superset of K ~ and Ks; but it of course assumes that 
Cn(K'O{S}) and Cn(K"U{A}) are the same set. We shall see below, how- 
ever, that this identification is not valid either in our modelling of Cn, as 
long as we are concerned with the language L1 specified below. In the more 
comprehensive language L2, Cn(K'u{B}) and Cn(K"U{A}) wilt be identical, 
but only at the expense of inconsistency, a 
4In anticipation of things to be explained below: In L1, Cn(Cn({A})U{B}) corresponds 
to the sentences satisfied by the E-relation based on J_-<B-<A-<T, Cn(Cn({B})U{A}) cot- 
139 
It is, however, utterly implausible to assume that adding B after A (or 
adding A after B) to a belief state that is totally ignorant about A and B 
leads to an inconsistent belief state. In Rott (1989a) I argued that the right 
lesson to be drawn from the G~rdenfors incompatibility result is that con- 
sistent revisions by new items of belief, which I call additions, are not to be 
identified with expansions. Now let us write K°A for the result of adding A 
to K. In the final analysis, we see how the puzzle caused by the GKrdenfors 
incompatibility theorem gets resolved. We will develop an account of how 
consistent additions of sentences are possible by adding new pieces of infor- 
mation to some set of premises from which a belief state is generated. What 
we then get is that (K°A)°B equals (K°B)°A but that no longer (K°h)C(K°h)° B
o1" (K°B)G(K°B)°A. We summarize our preliminary overview of the different 
possiblities of cutting the chain of proof of the G£rdenfors incompatibility 
theorem in the table on the next pageJ 
1 .3  P rogram 
This paper is intended to be the first part of a trilogy. We shall base the 
notion of a belief revision model on the concept of a relation of epistemic 
entrenchment ("E-relation"). We discuss the properties, the motivation and 
the finite representability of E-relations. Then we say what it means that 
a relation of epistemic entrenchment satisfies a sentence. Sentences of four 
different languages will be considered. 6 First, we have the purely "truth- 
functional" language L0 of propositional logic with the symbols -,, &, V, - . ,  
_L and T. In the present paper we will then examine the language L1 with 
an additional binary conditional operator ~-~ which connects entences from 
Lo. In the second part, we extend L1 to L2 by admitting the possibility that 
Ll-sentences are connected by the classical operators of L0; in particular L1 
allows for negations and disjunctions of conditionals. Finally, in the third 
part of the trilogy, we shall make some comments on  L3 which extends L2 
by permitting nested conditionals. This last part will largely be devoted 
responds to A_-<A-<B-<T. In L2, however, B cannot be consistently added to Cn({A}) at 
all. 
5Admittedly, it is unlikely that the full meaning of this table is transparent for the 
reader at the present stage. I apologize for this. 
6We identify a language with the set of its sentences. 
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Proving G~irdenfors's theorem 
Let K be "totally ignorant" about A and B. 
Proof idea: 
I -~(A&B)D-~A E K°A C I(~.~ _D K% ~ -,(A&B)EI-~B 1 
72 :$: If so, (K.@ -,(has) would be inconsistent. 
Ideas to get this to work: 
theory addition 
K ~ K°h =Cn(KU { A }) 
K~- - . . .  I L1 
K°{A,B} __D K°A,K°B no 
K°A&B _D K°A,K° s no no no no 
since Cn is not classically monotonic 
(KOh)O s _ (KOB)O h no yes yes 
(K°A)°B D K°A yes 
Proof of theorem 
base addition 
r ru{A} 
Cn ~ ~ Cn 
K ~-~ K°A 
L2 L1 L2 
no no  no  










to the application of the present logic Cn in belief revision. It is due to 
the fact that we can model belief revisions and keep the Ramsey test for 
conditionals without falling prey to the G~.rdenfors incompatibility theorem 
that the present logic is called a logic for belief revision. We shall mainly be 
concerned with belief additions, and it will turn out that the method of belief 
revision advocated violates the preservation principle. W  treat additions and 
revisions not only by "objective" sentences from Lo, but also by conditionals 
and compounds of conditionals. 
In the present paper we confine ourselves to L1. In order to develop a 
logic which suits our purposes we do not explicate the relation 
F~A,  or equivalently, AECn(F) 
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in the usual way as meaning that every E-relation which satisfies F also sat- 
isfies A. This would give us too few consequences of r .  We restrict the class 
of E-relations that are suitable for F and adopt the following criterion of the 
preferential-models-approach: every E-relation that "minimally", or "prefer- 
entially', satisfies F also satisfies A. In so doing we make Cn nonmonotonic. 
The main task then will be to find the right notion of minimality. Three 
candidates will be considered. The first one will turn out to be insufficient, 
the second one is quite satisfactory. But we will choose a third one which gives 
us a unique minimal (in fact a smallest) E-relation for every consistent finite 
and what is more, for every "well-founded" premise set r .  In the last section 
of this paper we examine the inference patterns validated by the resulting 
conditional logic Cn. In particular we show that the so-called "counterfactual 
fallacies" (see Lewis 1973, Section 1.8) are defeasibly valid, or valid by default. 
2 Be l ie f  rev is ion sys tems and ep is temic  en- 
t renchment  
G~rdenfors (1988, p. 148) defined a belief revision system as a pair (K],*) 
where K] is a set of belief sets, i.e., a set of sets of sentences that are closed 
under the consequence r lation Cno of classical propositional logic, and where 
* is a belief revision function taking any belief set K from K] and any Lo- 
sentence A to the new belief set *(K,A)E/C, or simply K'A, which is to be 
interpreted as the minimal revision of K needed to accept A. Moreover, it is 
required that a belief revision system is rational in the sense that it satisfies 
a set of rationality postulates originally specified by G~rdenfors in 1982 (see 
G~denfors 1988, Section 3.3). Equivalently, we can say that a belief revision 
system is a set {( K,*K): KEK]}, where *K, the revision function associated 
with K, is obtained by putting *K(A)=*(K,A) for each KEK~. 
Now let KE/C be fixed. G~rdenfors howed that it is, in a very strict 
sense of the term, the same thing to have a belief revision function *K for 
K as it is to have a belief contraction function -K for K satisfying another 
set of rationality postulates. The relevant connections are furnished by the 
so-called Levi identity 
*K=R(-K) is defined by K*A=Cn0(K--,AU{A}) 
and the so-called Harper identity 
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--K=C(*K) is defined by K-A=KMK*-~A 
(see Ggrdenfors t988, Section 3.6). More recently, Ggrdenfors and Makinson 
(1988) showed that it is the same thing to have a contraction function -K 
satisfying the relevant set of rationality postulates as it is to have a relation 
of epistemic entrenchment, or shortly an E-relation, with respect o K. Now, 
what are E-relations? An E-relation with respect o K, denoted by m~K~ is 
a relation holding between L0-sentences. For A,BEL0, A~KB is supposed to 
mean that B is at least as firmly entrenched in K as A or, better, Withdrawing 
A from K is not harder than withdrawing B. This can be made quite precise 
by an idea again due to Ggrdenfors. Suppose you are pressed to give up either 
A or B (where ~/A&B), which appears to be the same as to give up A&B. Now 
you decide to give up A just in case B is at least as firmly entrenched in K 
as A. Since by supposition you have to retract either A or B, this explication 
clearly entails that A_<KB or B<KA. 
E-relations <~K are to satisfy the following conditions (we drop the sub- 
script 'K' when there is no danger of confusion): 
(El) If A_<B and B~C then A<C (Transitivity) 
(E2) If 0#r~-A then B_A for some ser  (Entailment) 
(E3) If B<A for every S then ~-A (Maximality) 
(E4) If K~L0 then A_<B for every B iff A~tK (Minimality) 
Here and throughout this paper, F~-A is short for AECn0(F), AbB is short 
for {A}hB and ~'A is short for 0~-A. Condition (E4) expresses the fact that 
the relation ~_~K of epistemic entrenchment is interesting only within the 
set K. Outside K, all sentences have equal - -  viz., minimal - -  epistemic 
entrenchment. Condition (E2) replaces G~rdenfors's conditions 
(E2a) If AFB then A<B (Dominance) 
(E2b) A_<A&B or B<A&B (Conjunctiveness). 
(compare G£rdenfors 1988, Section 4.6, and G£rdenfors and Makinson 1988). 
It is easily verified that in the presence of (El) and when applied to belief 
sets, (E2) is equivalent to the conjunction of (E2a) and (E2b). Apart from 
reducing the number of postulates, (E2) has two more advantages. First, it 
has a very clear motivation. For suppose that FbA and B2~A for all BEF. 
The latter means, roughly, that it is easier to give up A than give up any 
B in F, which is to say that we may keep all of F when removing A. But 
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as A is derivable from F by classical propositional logic, we cannot really, 
or rationally, remove A while keeping P. In this sense (E2) may be called a 
rationality criterion. But secondly, note that (E2) makes sense even when K 
is not closed under Cn0. Consider for example the set K={A,B,C,A&B&C}. 
Wllile (E2b) does not apply here, (E2) says that A&B&C is at least as firmly 
entrenched in K as A or B or C. This is, I believe, in accordance with our 
intuitions about the rational removal of sentences. 
From <, we define the strict relation < and the equivalence relation - in 
the usual way: A<B iff A_<B and B~A, and A -B  iff A_<B and B<A. Notice 
that the connectivity condition A<B or B<A follows from (El) and (E2). 
Thus A<B is equivalent to B~A. Other well-known properties of E-relations 
are the substitutivity of Cn0-equivalents and the useful 
A_<B iff A<A&B iff A'--A&B. 
We say that an E-relation _< is finite iff - partitions L0 into finitely many 
equivalence classes, and we say that < is a well-ordering E-relation iff every 
non-empty set of L0-sentences has a smallest element under <. Of course, the 
well-ordering E-relations include the finite ones. Welt-ordering E-relations 
will play a key role in later sections of this paper. The epistemological draw- 
back of E-relations which are not well-ordering is evident in the case of mul- 
tiple contractions and revisions. When one is forced to give up at least one of 
the sentences in some set P which possesses no smallest element, it is very dif- 
ficult to see what should be done. No decision to give up one or more certain 
sentences can be the best decision. People having coarser but well-ordering 
E-relations are better off. 
We have to say how contraction functions -g  are constructed with the 
help of epistemic entrenchment relations <K- In G~rdenfors and Makinson 
(.1988) it is shown that the definitions 
{KN{B:A<KAVB} i f~A,  
-K=C(<K)  is given by K-A = K otherwise. 
and 
<K--E(--K) is given by A<KB iff A~K-A~B or I-A~B. 
just do the right thing and fit together perfectly. As we will be concerned with 
revisions only, we take down the direct link between revisions and relations 
of epistemic entrenchment. 
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Observat ion  1 Let R(<_K)=dfR(C(<_K)) and E(*K)=aE(C(*K)). Then 
{B:'-A<K-.AVB} if~/-.A, 
(i) If*K=R(<_K) then K*A = Lo otherwise. 
5i) If <_x~:=E(*K) then A<_KB iff A~g*-,Av-,s or }-A&B. 
(iii) R(<K) satisfies the aiirdenfors postulates for revisions if <--K is an 
E-relation with respect o If, and E(*K) is an E-relation with respect 
to K if *I~- satisfies the Giirdenfors postulates for revisions. Finally, 
R(E(*K))=*K and E(R(<_K))=<_K. 
Proofs of the Observations are collected in an appendix at the end of the 
paper. 
It is of crucial importance for the success of this paper that the reader 
accepts the notion of epistemic entrenchment as a useful and well-considered 
tool of analysis. First, he or she is recommended to consult the seminal discus- 
sions in G~rdenfors (1988, Chapter 4) and G~rdenfors and Makinson (1988). 
Secondly, it is shown in Rott (19895) and (1989c) that contractions con- 
structed from relations of epistemic entrenchment are equivalent in a very 
strict sense to both partial meet contractions (see Alchourr6n, G~rdenfors 
and Makinson 1985) and safe contractions (see Alchourr6n and Makinson 
1985, 1986). And thirdly, Lindstrbm and Rabinowicz (1990) develop an in- 
teresting liberalized notion of epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilies. 
We take it for granted that contractions and revisions using epistemic en- 
trenchment have a proper standing by now. 
So far we have seen that a G£rdenfors belief revision system can be rep- 
resented by a set {(K,_<K): KE/C}, where/C is a set of belief sets and _<K is 
an E-relation with respect o K, for each KEK~. To reach our final definition 
of a belief revision system, we make two more adjustments. In the first step, 
we note that we can recover every consistent belief set K from ~--K through 
K = K0(_<K) =dr {A: I<KA} (¢•). 
That this is true is clear from (E4). So a belief revision system can be repre- 
sented as {__K: KE/C}. K: can be treated as an arbitrary index set as long as 
we remember that fo~ KeK '  we have Ko(_<g)¢Ko(<~c). It is hard, however, 
to think of a motivation for this restriction. An E-relation mirrors a person's 
"objective" beliefs (i.e., beliefs expressible in L0) as well as his dispositions 
to change his objective beliefs in response to incoming objective information 
(recall the definition of R(_<K)). Two persons then with different relations of 
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epistemic entrenchment are in different epistemic states, even if they agree 
on the objective beliefs they currently hold. So I suggest as my second step 
to give up this restriction. Taking E-relations as primitive and belief sets as 
derived by the equation just mentioned, we can do without belief sets at all. 
Furthermore, we can drop (E4) from the set of requirements for E-relations. 
E-relations are no longer E-relations with respect o some belief set K, but 
belief sets are belief sets obtained from some E-relation <. We do not need 
the index set K: any more. My official definition of a belief revision system 
reads thus: 
Def in i t ion 1 A belief revision system is any set E of E-relations, i.e., binary 
relations over Lo satisfying (El) through (E3). We say that a belief revision 
system E is Ggrdenforsian/f and only if for every <_ and <_' in E, if I(0 (<)= 
Ko(<') then <--< ' /  
3 Bases for relations of epistemic 
entrenchment  
In the course of this paper we shall often want to discuss concrete xamples 
of E-relations. As E-relations are infinite subsets of L0×L0, this is not a 
completely trivial matter. What we need is a finite representation f some 
interesting E-relations which enables us to retrieve the full E-relations in a 
canonical and easily understandable way. We shall introduce the appropriate 
means in this section. 
Def in i t ion 2 A base for an E-relation, or simply, an E-base, is a pair (B,-<) 
where B is a set of Lo-sentences and "< is a non-strict weak ordering of, i.e., 
a reflexive, transitive and connected relation over, 13. 
7We might also call such belief revision systems funcfional. For they specify a unique 
revision K*A for every AEL0 and every belief set K such that £K=df{_<EE: K0(_<)=K} is 
not empty. In general belief revision systems, there are several candidate revisions, one fo  
each <EEK. This perspective invites interesting comparisons with the work of Lindstrhm 
and Rabinowicz (1990). For non-empty £K, for instance, we find that A£K is no E- 
relation in our sense, but an epistemic entrenchment ordering in the sense of Lindstrhm and 
Rabinowicz's Definition 3.1. Alsosee their representation Theorem 3.14. Notice, however, 
that the "skeptical" intersection of all candidate revisions N {{B: -~A<-~AVB}: <EEK} is 
representable as {B:-~AVB2~*-~A} where <*=U EK. <* is yet another kind of relation (cf. 
Observation 7 below). 
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Note that 13 need not be consistent and that -~ need not be antisymmetrical. 
Given an E-base (13,-'~), a 13-cut is any subset S of 13 such that if AES and 
A-~B then BES. Since ~ is connected, 13-cuts are nested. 
Def in i t ion 3 Let (13,"~) be an E-base. Then the E-relation <=E(-~) gener- 
ated by (13,___) is given by 
A<__B iff for al113-cuts S, if AcCno(S) then BECno(S), 
for all Lo-sentences A and B. 
We have to verify that this definition really does what we want. 
Observat ion  2 Let (13,~) be an E-base. Then E(-<) is an E-relation. 
An E-base (13,___) can rightly be called a base for the generated E-relation 
E(-~) only if the relationships as specified by ~ are preserved in E(_).  That 
is, with <=E(-<), if for every A and B in 13, A_B if and only if A-~B, or more 
succinctly, if <A13 x13 = _. We would like to know under what circumstances 
an E-base is a base for its generated E-relation. The following observation 
demonstrates the usefulness of the Entailment condition. 
Observat ion  3 An E-base (13,"~) is a base for E('~) if and only if ~_ satisfies 
(E2) over 13. 
Notice that if -~ satisfies (E2) over 13 there are in general many E-relations 
besides E(_~) which preserve the relationships as specified by _. These re- 
lationships between the sentences in 13 might be viewed as providing partial 
information about some underlying full relation of epistemic entrenchment. 
An E-base (13,~), however, is intended to be a means for discussing the 
unique E-relation E(-~) generated by it. 
In the following, we shall use, without any further indication, only E-bases 
satisfying (E2). 
An E-base (13,"~) is called finite if 13 is finite. In this case, the relation 
~=-~N-~ -1 obviously partitions/3 into finitely many equivalence classes. Let 
the number of equivalence classes be n. We denote the equivalence classes by 
13i. The indices are Chosen so as to ensure that i_<j iff A_B  for every AE131 
and BE13j. We employ the following convenient string notation for ~: 
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Z -~ A0~ "" .. .  - A0~o -< AI~ -~ .. .  ~ A~% -< ...  
• .. -< Am1 - . . .  -~ A,~%-< T 
B,, B,~+I 
where -<=--<-~, mkO, n0_>O and n ik l  for i= l , . . . ,m.  It is understood 
that (B-Cn0(0))U{-L,T) = BoUB1U...UBmUB,,+I. If BNCn0(0) is empty 
(this will be the case in the intended applications), then Bo={±} and 
m=n if B is consistent, but m=n-1 if B is inconsistent. If BNCno(0) 
is non-empty, then B0={±} and re=n-1 if B is consistent, but m=n-  
2 if B is inconsistent. It is easy to check that the equivalence classes 
with respect to "--=E(_)N(E(_)) -1 are given by Cno(13~UB;+IU...UBm)- 
Cn0(B~+lUB~+2U... UB,,) for i=0, . . .  ,m, and Cn0(O). 
4 Epistemic entrenchment semantics for 
condit ionals 
4.1  Monoton ic  semant ics  
Having a precise notion of a belief revision system at his disposal, G£rdenfors 
was able to develop a formal epistemic semantics for conditionals with the 
help of the following version of the Ramsey test (R): 
(R') Let (/C,*) be a belief revision system in the sense of G£rdenfors. Then, 
for every KE/C and every A,BcL0, AO--~B E K iff B E *(K,A). 
By Observation 1, this is equivalent to 
AO--~B E K iff --A <K-~AVB or t---A. 
With Definition 1 we modified the concept of a belief revision system by 
considering E-relations as primitive" and allowing one and the same belief set 
to be associated with several E-relations. Therefore, we will not speak of the 
inclusion of a conditional in a belief set but of the satisfaction of a conditional 
by an E-relation. s 
8The following definition is formally more similar to Lewis's (1973) evaluation of con- 
ditionals than appears at first sight. See Grove (1988) and G£rdenfors (1988, Section 4.8). 
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Defini t ion 4 An E-relation -< satisfies a conditional AD-*B iff ~A < ~AVB 
or F--A. 
The principM condition -~A<-~AVB, i.e., --A<A--~B, can be motivated as 
follows. When an E-relation -< says that the material conditional A--.B is 
more firmly entrenched than -~A, this can be taken to mean that the mate- 
rial conditional is accepted not just because the negation of the antecedent 
is accepted. And more, if a person in epistemic state -< should come to learn 
that A is in fact true, this would not destroy his or her belief in A--~B. Put as 
a slogan, a natural language conditional is the corresponding material con- 
ditional believed more firmly than the negation of its antecedent. Note that 
conditionals express trict <-relationships, not non-strict <-relationships. In
view of Observation 1, A<B is expressible by means of the Ll-sentence [f 
-~AV-~B then B. But only in L~ will we dispose of a linguistic expression for 
A-<B. 
An E-relation -< is said to satisfy an Lo-sentence A iff A is in K0(-<), 
i.e., iff ±<A2 By (E1)-(E3), No(_<) is consistent and closed under Cno, for 
every E-relation -<. E-relations are non-classical models, since, e.g., it is not 
the case that -< satisfies -~A iff -< does not satisfy A. Nor can E-relations 
be regarded as the models of a three-valued "truth-functional" logic with 
the values 'accepted', rejected' and 'undecided', because it is impossible to 
deterIrfine the value of AVB from the values of A and B if the latter are both 
'undecided'. It is either 'undecided' or 'accepted'. 1°
If an E-relation -< satisfies an Ll-sentence A we write -<~A, and we set 
K(_<) =dr {AELI:-<~A}. 
Sometimes we say that K(-<) is the belief set or the theory associated with the 
E-relation -<. Obviously, K(-<)NLo=K0(-<). An E-relation satisfies a set F of 
Ll-scntences if it satisfies every element of F, i.e., if FCK(<).  Sometimes, 
when P is a given premise set, we say that -< is an E-relation for P iff -< 
satisfies F. More semantic concepts are readily defined along the standard 
lines: 
9As regards satisfaction, a  "objective" L0-sentence A is equivalent to the conditional 
T[3--~A. But they differ in syntactic behaviour. In L1, we have for instance A[=I-*A but not 
(TD--*A)D--~(T[:i--*A). Moreover, in Part 2, we shall argue that -~A differs from -~(TD--~A) 
in meaning. 
1°Like belief sets, E-relations eem to obey the logic of supervaluations instead. Cf. 
Martin (1984). 
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Definit ion 5 An Lx-sentence A is called satisfiable or consistent if it is sat- 
isfied by some E-relation, 11 and A is called (monotonically) valid, in symbols 
~xA, if it is satisfied by every E-relation. P is said to be consistent if there 
is an E-relation for F. An Ll-sentence A is (monotonically) entailed by a 
set F of L1-sentences, in symbols F~IA or equivalently AECnx(r), /f every 
E-relation satisfying F also satisfies A. 
Example 1 Now, at last, we are able to deal with the introductory 
beach walk and the generalizations wedrew from it. Remember that we have 
set out to find a way to get (no - -  not a hamburger, but) the paradigmatic 
inference 12
{AVB} ~-~Ac:I-+B (3) 
and yet block the inference 
{AVB,A,~B} ~-,AO-~B (4) 
Let us see if our logic Cnl is appropriate. The inference (4) is indeed blocked. 
Consider the E-relation _< generated by the E-base 
± -4 AVB ~_ A __ ~B -4 T 
Obviously, < satisfies all the premises of (4), and it does so in an intuitively 
plausible way. In order to satisfy the conclusion of (4), < would have to be 
such that A<AVB holds. There would have to be a B-cut S such that AVB 
but not A is in Cn0(S). But there is none. 
Next consider (3). The most natural E-relation for the single premise 
AVB, viz., that generated by the E-base 
_L -41 AVB -<a T ,  
behaves well. It indeed yields A<IAVB, since AVB but not A is a Cno- 
consequence of SAvB--af{CEB: AVB~IC}={AVB}. But of course there are 
more E-relations atisfying AVB, for example the one generated by the E- 
base 
± -42 A -<2 T .  
11Recall that E-relations themselves, or rather their Lo-images Ko(_<), are always 
consistent. 
19In these and all similar considerations to follow, it is understdod that A and B are 
contingent L0-sentences which are independent with respect o Cn0. 
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And it gets clear immediately that the E-relation E(-%) does not satisfy 
--Ac~-~B. So we cannot validate (3), if ~1 is substituted for ~. (End of 
example) 
The objection to this last line of reasoning is that there is nothing which 
could justify the E-base ({ A},__2) if all we know is AVB. In every conceivable 
sense, the E-base ({AVB},___I) is much more natural for the singleton premise 
set {AVB} than ({A},~2). Among the E-relations satisfying some premise set 
F, it appears, there are E-relations that are appropriate for F and E-relations 
that are inappropriate for F. There exists, one may suppose, a preference 
ordering among the E-relations satisfying F. And only the best E-relations 
matter. If all of the best ones satisfy the conclusion of the inference, then 
the inference may be called "valid". Section 4.2 will reveal that we have 
just argued for employing the techniques of a quite well-known kind of non- 
monotonic logic. 
Before turning to this abstract opic, let us remain at the paradigmatic 
infernce patterns (3) and (4) for a moment. The problem was found to lie 
in the validation of (3). What is it that makes E(___2) so much worse for the 
single premise AVB than E(__.I)? It is safe to assume that in this particular 
case where AVB is supposed to be all one knows, the relationship I<A is 
not warranted. But what is the general mistake? Three suspicions come to 
one's mind. 
• E(__2) satisfies too many sentences. In order not to invoke "beliefs" 
that are not justified by the premise set, we should try to minimize the 
set of sentences atisfied by an appropriate E-relation for the premise 
set. Just as in usual monotonic logics the deductive closure of a set F 
is the minimal theory including F, we should opt for minimal theories 
(associated with some E-relation) including F in the present case. 
,, E(__.2) satisfies too many Lo-sentences. The motivation for this idea is 
the same as for the last one. If it should turn out insufficient o minimize 
the number of Li-sentences (L1 is the language under consideration), 
it seems plausible to attribute a preferred status to the "objective" 
L0-sentences. 
• E(___2) assigns to some Lo-sentence, for example to A, a gratuitously 
high "rank" of epistemic entrenchment which is not justified by the 
single premise AVB. It seems prudent not to attribute a greater degree 
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of irremovability to any objective sentence than is explicitly warranted 
by the premise set. A believer should be prepared to give up his or her 
beliefs by minimizing epistemic entrenchments. 
I think that all three of these suggestions have a sound basis. In Sections 
5-7~ we shah examine the consequences of taking them into accout within 
the framework of nonmonotonic reasoning we are now going to introduce. 
4.2 Nonmonoton ic  semant ics  
We said that when inquiring whether A follows from a given premise set 
£ we only want to consider the preferred E-relations satisfying £. In the 
three informal objections against the inadequate E-base which invalidates 
(3) we found that we wanted to minimize certain parameters of E-relations 
satisfying F. These formulations will ring a bell in the ears of those acquainted 
with the work that has been done in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning. 
In fact, we can draw on the minimal models approach or preferential models 
approach which was developed in its general form by Shoham (1987, 1988). 
Makinson (1989) generalized it to cases in which the models considered axe 
allowed to bey like E-relations, non-classical. We now adapt some of their 
central definitions to our purposes of providing an epistemic semantics for 
conditionals. 
Definition 6 Let F" be a strict partial ordering of (i.e., an asymmetric and 
transitive relation over) the class of all E-relations. Then an E-relation <_ is 
called minimal (or preferred) iff there is no E-relation <_' such that <_'r-<_.13 
Let £ be a set of Ll-sentences. An E-relation ~ is called minimal for F if 
<~F and there is no E-relation <_' such that <_I~F and <'E<_. In this case 
we say that < minimally (or preferentially) satisfies F (with respect o r )  
and write <_~E-F. We say that A is minimally valid, in symbols ~r-A, if 
every minimal E-relation satisfies A. We say that F minimally entails A, in 
symbols F~r-A, if every minimal E-relation for F satisfies A. We also write 
Cnr(F) for {AeLI :F~cA}.  
Be aware that if rCF"  then there are at least as many E-minimal E-relations 
as r'-minimal ones, and hence Cnc(r)C_Cnc,(r). The intuitive idea behind 
13This is not a very interesting definition. With respect o the three orderings for E- 
relations uggested in the next section, there is only one smallest F_~relation, viz., that 
generated by the E-base ±-<T. 
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preferential entailment in our case is that only a minimal E-relation for F is 
an epistemic state which is warranted if all the items one explicitly knows 
are given by F. And only warranted belief states hould be called upon when 
determining the consequences of a premise set. The task before us now is 
to explicate what features can make an E-relation count as "minimal" or 
"preferred". 
From the non-monotonic point of view, it is interesting to enquire the 
circumstances under which an inference is robust (or persistent or stable) 
under possible nrichments of the premise set. We say that F robustly entails 
A (with respect to some given [-), in symbols F EA, iff F EA and for every 
superset E of F, E~r-A. It turns out that normally, and in particular in our 
concrete instantiations of r- presented below, ~r- is just identical with the 
old monotonic onsequence r lation ~1: 
Observat ion 4 Let [- be a strict partial ordering of the class of E-relations, 
F be a set of Ll-sentences and A an Ll-sentence. Then 
(i) If F~I A then F~r-A. 
(ii) I f  every E-relation <_ is E-minimal for K(<_), then if F~cA then 
F~IA. 
It is natural to assume that every E-relation < is among the preferred E- 
relations for the total set K(<) of sentences satisfied by <. We shall find 
that this assumption is fulfilled in all three orderings of E-relations to be 
discussed in the next section. 14 
5 Three orderings for relations of epistemic 
entrenchment 
In this section, we are going to work out the details of the three suggestions 
that were made in response to the failure of (3) in the monotonic setting of 
Cnl. The first one was that an E-relation which is "grounded in" or "induced 
by" a given premise set P should not satisfy more sentences than necessary. 
That is~ an E-relation < for F is better than another E-relation <' for F if 
K(_<) is a proper subset of K(_<'). 
14See Definition 7, Observation 6, Observation 13 and its corollary. 
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Def in i t ion  7 Let <_ and <_' be E-relations. Then <_ is at least as K-good as 
~_', in symbols ~_EK~_ I, if and only if K(~_)C_K(~_I). ~_ is K-preferred over 
<_', in symbols ~_[-K(_ I, if and only if (__E__K(__ ! and not <tg-'K__(.15 
As we are taking E-relations, rather than belief sets, as primary represen- 
tations of epistemic states, it is desirable to replace this metamathematical  
definition referring to sets of sentences and satisfaction by a purely mathe- 
matical condition. 
Observat ion  5 Let < and <_~ be E-relations. Then the following conditions 
are equivalent: 
(i) <_ E_K<_' ; 
(ii) <l C <;  
(iii) < CC_ <1; 
( iv)- '  c_ - .  
An obvious corollary is 
Coro l la ry  Let ~ and ~_1 be E-relations. Then the following conditions are 
equivalent: 
(i) <_ ['-'K~I ; 
(iO <l c < ; 
(iii) < C <' ;  
( iv)- '  c - .  
Now we have got quite a good picture of what K-preference consists in. An 
E-relation _< satisfies less Ll-sentences than another E-relation _<~ if and only 
if - IC - .  This means that whenever two L0-sentences A and B are in the same 
equivalence class with respect o - i  then they are in the same equivalence 
class with respect ot - ,  and besides there are L0-sentences A and B which 
are equivalent with respect o - but not with respect o -q  - is a coarsening 
of -q  If -~ is given by an E-base in string notation, then a K-preferred -" 
is obtained by replacing one or more occurances of -< in the string by - .  
We can rephrase the idea of K-preference as follows: Choose as coarse an E- 
relation (for a given premise set r) as possible] Do not impose unnecessary 
differences in the degrees of epistemic entrenchment] 
15.The reader be warned that the direction of '_E' and 'r"' may be the reverse of what 
he or she has expected. The reason for this is that the preferred E-relations are, in some 
intuitive as well as formal sense, minimal. 
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Plausible as all this may be, it is not sufficient. This is borne out dra- 
matically by our paradigm Example 1, where for F={AVB} the E-bases 
.I--<IAVB-<I"I- and -l--<2A-~s-l" both generate minimal E-relations for F with 
respect o r"K. For any attempt o extend -'21 and -~s will result in the triv- 
ial base _I_-<T and thus fail to satisfy F. Note in particular that E(-<I) and 
E(-<s) are incomparable with respect o t-K, since --At::l--*S is in K(E(_<I))- 
K(E(_-<s)) and A is in K(E(-<2))-K(E(_-<I)). We do not get r~cK-~Aa--,B. 
Preference with respect o l--K, therefore, cannot be the key for the validation 
of (3). 
But clearly, E(-<~) should be preferred to E(__.s) in Example 1. It seems 
obvious that the defect of ~2 as an E-base for F={AVB} lies in the fact 
that -l--<sA, i.e., that A is satisfied by E(___s). There is no reason for this 
to be found in F. So we turn to the second idea propounded at the end 
of Section 4.1, namely that E(_-_<2) satisfies too many L0-sentences. In order 
to further compare the E-relations E(-<~) and E(__2) even though K(E(-<~)) 
and K(E(-<2)) are not related by set inclusion, we adopt the following maxim: 
Among the K-minimal E-relations, choose only those that commit us to as 
few Lo-sentences as possible/Do not adopt unwarranted "objective" beliefs] 
Definition 8 Let <_ and <~ be E-relations. Then < is at least as K0-good 
as <_', in symbols _<__.K0_<', if and only if <(EK~ t, or <_ and <_' are EK- 
incomparable and Ko(<)C_Ko(<'). <_ is K0-preferred over <_', in symbols 
<~I'-K0___~' , i f  and only i f<Eg0 <' and not _<'__.K0_<. 
The definition of EK0 is a bit complicated. Fortunately, the strict version 
r-K0 which is the one that in fact enters into the nonmonotonic semantical 
apparatus, is captured by a nice and easy condition. 
Observation 6 Let <_ and <_1 be E-relations. Then 
<rKo< ' iff ,Y(<)cK(<_') or Ko(<_)CKo(<_'). 
Note that FK0 is transitive because K(<)cK(<')  implies K0(<)CKo(<'). 
Being an extension of V-K, t--K0 allows us to compare more E-relations than 
the former. As a consequence, Cnr-Ko (F) is a superset of CncK(r) for every 
premise set F. In most cases, the latter will be a proper subset of the former. 
This is true in Example 1, which K0-preference gets right. It is evident hat 
_I_-<IAVB-<z'I- is the base of the only minimal E-relation for F={AVB} with 
respect to I"K0, so we have 1-' I-r-K° "-AD-+B. We have managed to find a 
plausible way of validating the desired inference (3). 
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It is an interesting and important question whether K0-preference gives, 
as in Example 1, always a unique E-relation for a (finite) premise set F. The 
answer is no: 
Example  2 Let F={A,B,-~AI:~B}. Then the E-bases £-~A~_B< 
AVB-~T and _L-~A-~B~_~AVB-~IT both generate E-relations <=E(! )  and 
<~=E(___ r) for F. Both < and <' are K-minimal for F. Any attempt o reduce 
the number of equivalence classes of < and <:' will result in a violation of 
either _L<(0A, ±<(0B or A<(')AVB. In particular, < and <:~ are incompara- 
ble with respect o EK. On the one hand, < satisfies but _~t does not satisfy 
-~BI::I--+A, on the other hand, <~ satisfies but < does not satisfy ~AV-~Bo--+B. 
Furthermore, Ko(_<) =Cno({ A&B })=Ko(_<'), and obviously any E-relation for 
F must satisfy Cno({A&B}). Hence both < and <:' axe Ko-minimal for F. It is 
straightforward to check that < and "(~ are the only Ko-preferred E-relations 
for F. (End of example) 
Intuitively, Ko-preference seems to be a very natural ordering of E- 
relations. Still there is an objection. We know from Example 2 that in gen- 
eral there is more than one minimal E-relation with respect o Ego for a 
given premise set F. The consequences of F, according to CnE~o, are those 
Ll-sentences which are satisfied by all r-K0-minimal E-relations for F, i.e., 
rl {K(<): _< is rKo-minimal for F}. The question arises as to what the epis- 
temic state is, if F is all one explicitly knows and F admits various r'Ko- 
minimal candidates. It turns out that in most cases it cannot be an E-relation. 
To see this, we define K(_<)={AELI: _<~A} for an arbitrary binary _~ over 
L0, to be the set {AEL0: A2~±} U {BD-+CELI: ~BVC~-~B}. 16
Observation 7 Let ~-1, . . . ,  ~_~ be E-relations and ~_ = ~_10... U~,~. Then 
(i) K(<_) = K(<_I)N... NK(<_~). 
5i) I f  ~* is an E-relation such that g(<_*) -- K( 'C l )N. . .N I ( (~) ,  then 
<_,=<. 
(iii) ~ fails to be an E-relation iff there are sentences A,B,C in Lo such 
that A<IB~_IC and C~_jA<jB for some l~_i,j~_n, and A<kB for every 
l<k<n. 
From this observation it is clear that if there are multiple Ego-minimal E- 
relations for a premise set F, we cannot expect to have a unique E-relation <* 
16I always presuppose that the satisfaction of an Ll-sentence is defined for non-E- 
relations < in the same way as for E-relations. Different, more complicated efinitions 
of satisfaction may make a big difference. 
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that satisfies exactly all those sentences satisfied by each of them. Given two 
E-relations I'1 and r2, in particular, we will in most cases find L0-sentences 
A,B,C such that A<IB_<IC and C_<2A<2B (or vice versa). For <*=E(_)U 
E(_'), we have in Example 2 AVB<*B and B<*A, but not AVB~*A, and, 
for the sake of illustration, in Example 1 we find that for <*=E(__.I)UE(__.2) 
AVB<*A and A<*_L, but not AVB<*.L. Violation of transitivity seems to 
be the rule rather than the exception. 
We would like to identify Cn(I') with the set of sentences accepted by 
an idealized "rational" believer whose only explicit information is given by 
F. We have seen, however, that if we take Cnc~ ° as Cn, there is in general 
no E-relation satisfying all and only the sentences in Cnr-~o (I'). Hence the 
believer's beliefs cannot be mirrored by an E-relation. This is an abstract 
problem as yet, concerning the formal representation f belief states. Why not 
just give up the doctine that an epistemic state is best represented by a single 
relation of epistemic entrenchment? In fact, in Part 2 of the present rilogy, 
we shall have to give up this doctrine anyway when considering disjunctions 
of conditionals. Moreover, in Part 3, we shall argue that when it comes to 
belief revision, it is not E-relations but premise sets which should be taken 
as the primary objects of revision. 
Yet we stick to the thesis that an epistemic state should be represented 
by a single E-relation in this paper. First, it seems reasonable to assume that 
something like a measure of the firmness of belief is transitive. Secondly, it 
is easily verified that in terms of the conditionals atisfied, the transitivity 
condition (El) is equivalent to 
If < ~ AVCD-~-~C and < ~= BVCD---,--C then < ~ AVBCY-~--B. 
(Transitivity by Conditionals) 
Substituting D for A, --E for B and D&-,E for C, we see that Transitivity by 
Conditionals entails 
If _< ~ DCY-*E and _< ~= -,E~--,-,D then _< ~ Dv-,EC~--,E. 
(Failure of Contraposition iv)
If one wants to retain these conditions for epistemic states, then one cannot 
opt for the transition to unions of E-relations. In Example 2, for instance, 
17Notice that __~DO--*E iff <~D[~-*-~DVE. - - We shall return to the failure of ¢ontra- 
postion for conditionals in Section 7 below and in Part 2 of the trilogy. 
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we find that <*=E(~)OE(__') satisfies --AD--*B, but neither --BD--~A nor 
-AV--Bt2-~B. I have to admit, though, that the intuitions behind such in- 
ference patterns are not very strong. 
The main reason for my tentative insistence on the one E-relation doctrine 
derives from the third idea put forward at the end of Section 4.1. We shall 
presently show that if we do not assign greater anks of epistemic entrench- 
ment to L0-sentences than is explicitly required by a given (well-behaved) 
premise set F, then P "induces" a unique minimal, and in fact a smallest, 
E-relation for I'. In sum, then, I do not want to say that K0-preference is not 
good, but I put it aside only because I think that there is a more promising 
alternative. 
In a way, this alternative just generalizes on the idea of K0-preference. 
Opting for an E-relation which is minimal with respect o Ego means opting 
for a maximal set of sentences with the lowest epistemic rank possible, viz., 
the rank of _1_. But why follow the prudent strategy of accepting things just 
to the degree they are explicitly warranted only at this lowest level? It seems 
to me that believers are well-advised if they adopt the distrustful maxim 
of universal minimality: Do not have more confidence in your items of belief 
than is assured by your premises/Assign to all sentences the lowest epistemic 
rank possible/ 
In order to make this idea more precise we need the notion of the rank of 
epistemic entrenchment of a sentence A according to an E-relation _<. This 
notion makes sense for well-ordering E-relations. 
Def in i t ion  9 Let <_ be a well-ordering E-relation. Then we define for any 
ordinal a 
a(<_) = {AELo-~d(<_): A<_B for all BELo-~d(<_)}, 
l . . -  
where 0(<) =dr 0 and ~d(<) =dr U{~(<):f l<~} for a>O. 
Then for every Lo-sentence A, rank_<(A)= iff 
As we can go on with this construction up to any arbitrary ordinal, rank< is 
well-defined for well-ordering E-relations even if L0 is supposed to have non- 
denumerably many atoms. And by construction, if there is no AEL0 such that 
rank<(A)=a for an ordinal a, then there is no BEL0 such that rank<(B)=fl 
for any fl>a. All ranks are "occupied". It is also easy to see that A<B if and 
only if rank<(A)_<rank<(B). If a finite E-relation is generated by an E-base 
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± "" Aol - . . .  ~- Ao,~ 5 -K An  " . . .  "~ Ai,~ -K . . .  
• .. "< Ami "" . . .  ~- A . .~  --K T 
satisfying (E2) over B then rank<(a~j)=i,  as expected. More generally, 
rank_<(a)=i for any A in Cn0(BiUB~+iU... Ul3m)-Cno(Bi+iUBi+2U... UBm). 
We can now formulate a precise definition for the new maxim. 
Def in i t ion  10 Let < and <<' be E-relations. Then < is at least as E-good as 
<_', in symbols <EE_<', if and only i f< is welt-ordering and <_' is not, or both 
< and <_' are well-ordering and rank< (A)<_rank<,(A) for every no-sentence 
A. <_ is E-preferred over <_', in symbols _<EE__.', if and only if <_E~<_' and 
not <'EE_<. 
It is easy to check that EE is antisymmetrical. Now our first task is to explore 
the relationship between E-preference and K-preference and K0-preference. 
Observat ion  8 Within the class of well-ordering E-relations, EK C_ EE. 
Coro l la ry  Within the class of well-ordering E-relations, EK C_ F" E. 
r-E is an extension of C-K just as r-K 0 was. The relation between EE and 
r"Z 0 , on the other hand, is more delicate. There are examples of E-relations 
< and <', for which <EK0<'  but not NEE_<', such as those based on 
_1_ -K A -K B -K T and 
± -K' B - 'C  -K' A -K' T , 
and also examples where the converse holds, such as those based on 
± -K A-~B -K C -K T and 
± -K ~ A -K ~ B~- 'C  -K t T 
The best we can do is state is the following 
Observat ion  9 Within the class of well-ordering E-relations, EE C -----Ko. 
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6 Constructing E-minimal relations of 
epistemic entrenchment for well-founded 
premise sets 
We decide to base the following considerations on t-'E. In this section we 
are going to show that with respect to r-E, every consistent finite set of 
Ll-premises possesses a unique minimal, and in fact a smallest, E-relation 
satisfying it. This allows us to keep the one-E-relation doctrine for all prac- 
tical applications of L1. We shall also consider the case of an infinite I'. 
An arbitrary set F of Ll-sentences can be given the following format. It 
divides into a set ro of L0-premises Ai and a set 1"1 of conditionals from L1- 
L0 of the form Bjt:]--+Cj. When trying to find an E-relation satisfying r ,  one 
can regard the premises as providing partial information about the set of E- 
relations - -  or preferably, about the E-relation - -  constituting the epistemic 
state of an individud whose only explicit information consists in r .  For the 
sake of simplicity, we cancel all conditionals Big:t--+Ci for which -~BiCCn0({3). 
By Definition 4, these conditionals are satisfied by every E-relation, so they 
do not matter. Recalling how satisfaction of Ll-sentences by E-relations has 
been defined, we can now describe the situation with the following figure: 
1 r I , , [  -< 1 
A1 I ~ ± < A1 
A2 , ~ _L < A2 
Aa ~ ~ _L < Aa 
: : : 
B1D--+C, J ~ "~B1 < BI-+C1 
B2~--~C2 , ~ -~B2 < B2~C2 
Ba[:l--+Ca , ~ -~Ba < Ba--+Ca 
Evidently, an L0-sentence Ai has the same satisfaction condition as the corre. 
sponding Ll-sentence TD-+Ai. Another simplifying move consists in identify- 
ing objective sentences with their conditional counterparts. We can therefore 
assume that every premise set r in L1 is a set {AiD--+Bi: iffI} of conditionals 
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where I is a possibly infinite index set and -~A~6Cn0(O) for every iEI. It will 
be helpful to have in mind a seperate picture for the simplified format: 
r I ' ' 1  -< I 
A10--~B1 J ~ --A1 < A I~B1 
A2CV-~B2 ~ ~ -~A2 < A2~B2 
A3[:~B3 J , -'A3 < A3~B3 
: : : 
Now the construction of an E-minimal E-relation for P, i.e., of an E-relation 
which assigns to all sentences the lowest epistemic rank possible, is pretty ob- 
vious. In the first step we note that the partial information about admissible 
E-relations provided by F "forces" all material conditionals A~--~B~ to be more 
entrenched than something, hence to be more entrenched than 2_. Remember- 
ing that the Entailment condition (E2) must be respected by all E-relations, 
we know that all Cno-consequences of the Ai~B~ 's must also be more en- 
trenched than 2_. Abbreviating the "Lo-counterpart" {Ai~Bi:  A~[:3--*Bi EF} 
of F by Lo(r), we now know that M1 sentences in A1 =dr Cno(L0(r)) obtain at 
least the first rank of epistemic entrenchment. In the second step, we collect 
all those -~Aj's which are in A1. The corresponding inequalities --Aj<Aj---,Bj 
are triggered and force all the Aj---~Bj's to be more entrenched than the rest 
- -  except for the Cn0-consequences of the Aj--,Bj 's, which are also lifted 
up to the second rank of epistemic entrenchment by (E2). This process of 
raising epistemic entrenchments a required by the "<-translations" of F and 
subsequent closing under Cn0 is repeated time and again. In the limit, we 
take intersections. Roughly, we are ready if no inequality is triggered any 
longer. There may arise serious complications but they cannot be examined 
without a formal definition. 
Def in i t ion 11 Let F--{AiD-~BI:iEI} be a set of Ll-sentences. Then 













Ao~ -- mot+ 1 , 
if A .  -- Cno(O) and 
= Cno(O) for  some < 
if A .  = Cno(O) and 
A~ ~_ Cno(O) for all fl < a, 
otherwise. 
Then for every Lo-sentence C, rankr(C)=c~ iff CEc~(F), and for every pair 
of Lo-sentences C and D, C-<rD iff rankr(C)-<rankr(D). 
A number of tasks lies before us. First, we have to check whether the defi- 
nition makes sense at a11, i.e., whether every L0-sentence gets a unique rank 
number a. We shall see that the definition works fine and terminates after a 
finite number of steps if F is consistent and finite. It is no real disadvantage 
that it fails for inconsistent premise sets, but it will be interesting to observe 
in which of the infinite cases it fails. Secondly, we verify that in all success- 
ful cases, the definition actually generates an E-relation for F. Thirdly and 
lastly, we show that E(F) is the I-E-smallest E-relation for F. 
The primary case in the definition of a(F) is of course captured by the 
last line. The worst thing that can happen in the construction process is that 
for some ordinal a, A,+l is identical with A,#Cn0(0). For that would mean 
that not only A,+I = Cn0({Ai~Bi:-~AiEA,}) = Cno({Ai~Bi:-~AiEA,+x}) 
= A,+2, but, by the same argument, that AT=A, for every 7>a.  As a 
consequence, 7(F) would be empty for 7>a,  and the processing of the -<- 
translations of the premises in F would be interrupted. Consider two examples 
for illustration. 
Example 3 Let F = {A[::~B&C, BE~-~A&-~C}. The translation in terms 
of epistemic entrenchment is 
-~A<A-~(B&C) and "~B<B--~(A&-~C). 
Now A0 is Lo, and A~ is Cn0({A~(B&C),B~(A&-,C)}), but this again is 
L0. So -~h and -~B are in A~, so A2 is again Cn0({A~(B&C),B-+(A&-,C)} 
= Lo, and so on for every A~. We never get an acceptable result. 
Example 4 Another problematic ase is F = {AIVAi+II~-*-~Ai: i=1,2, 
3, . . .  }. The _<-translations are 
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-~Ai&-~A~+I < (A~vAi+I)-+-~A~, i=1,2,3,..., 
or equivalently, 
-~Ai+, <-~Ai, i=1,2,3, . . . .  is 
As always, A0 is L0. A1 is Cno({(aivai+l)--+-~ai: i=1,2,3,... }) = Cn0({--ai: 
i=1,2,3, . . .  }). But then, for every i=1,2,3, . . . ,  -~A/&-~Ai+I is in A1, so A2 is 
again Cno({-~Ai: i=1,2,3,... }), and the same for every A~. We never manage 
to exploit the information provided by F. (End of examples) 
It turns out that the two premise sets have a different status. In Example 
3, P is inconsistent, and we shall see presently that every finite premise set 
which leads into this problem is inconsistent. So we need not bother about 
the problem for finite premise sets too much. In Example 4, on the other 
hand, P is consistent, since it is satisfied e.g. by the E-relation generated by 
the base 
2. -< ...-< -~Aa -< -~A= --< -~A~ -< T .  
The point illustrated by Example 4 is that there axe premise sets which 
do not admit well-'ordering E-relations. Since F translates to -~A¢+I<-~Ai, 
i=1,2,3, . . . ,  it is clear that no E-relation <: for F can pick out an _<-minimal 
sentence from the set {-~Ai: i=1,2,3,. . .  }. But as our definition is made for 
well-ordering E-relations only~ it is to be expected that it does not work fine 
in cases like Example 4. We suggest he following well-behavedness criterion 
for infinite premise sets: 
Definit ion 12 A premise set F={ AiD--+Bi: iEI} is called well-founded iff it 
satisfies the condition 
{-~Aj:jEJ} ~ Cno({Aj~Bj:jEJ}), for every non-empty JCI. 
Observe that only well-founded premise sets F admit well-ordering E- 
relations for F. For assume F is not well-founded and J~O is such 
that {-~Aj:jCJ}CCn0({Aj~Bj:jEJ}). Suppose for reductio that g is well- 
ordering and satisfies F. Consider { Aj-~ Bj: j E J }, and take a smallest element 
Ak~Bk of this set. By assumption,-~AkECn0({Aj--*Bj:jEJ}). So, by (E2), 
Aj---~Bj_<-~Ak for some jEJ. But Ak--*BkgAj---~Bj, so by (El) Ak---~Bk-<-~Ak, 
lSExamples like this have been the subject of considerable discussion in the literature. 
Measure again Lewis's (1973, p. 20) line and instantiate A~ as 'l_ewis's line is 1+(1/i) inches 
long.' 
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so <_ fails to satisfy AkO-~BkEF, so _< is no E-relation for F, and we have a 
contradiction. 
Now let us carefully collect some basic facts concerning the construction 
of E(F). 
Observat ion  10 Let r={Ai~--~Bi: iEI} be a set of Ll-sentcnces. Then 
(i) for all a, C o(O) c_ A +I 
(ii) for all ordinals a such that a(F)=A~-A~+I,  ~( I ' )  =af U{fl(r):f l<a} 
= Lo-A~; 
5ii) if F is finite and consistent then F is well-founded. 
Furthermore, if r is well-founded, then 
(iv) for all a, if A=CAc,+I then A~,=Cno(O); 
(v) for alla, {Ai--+Bi:-,AiEA,~+I} C_ {Ai-~BI:-.AiEA~}, and if {Ac--+Bi: 
--AIEA,,+,} = {Ai--*Bi:-,AiEA~}, then {Ai---~Bi:-,AiEA~} = O; 
(vi) there is an a such that TEa(P)=Cno(O); in particular, if F is finite 
and has n elements then TEa( I ' )  for some a<_n+l; 
(vii) for every Lo-sentence A, there is exactly one a such that AEa(F); 
(viii) for every a, Aa is an Lo-cut with respect o <_r, and for every non- 
empty Lo-cut S with respect o _<r, S=A~ for some a; 
(ix) for all Lo-sentences A and B, A<_rB iff AEA~, implies BEA~ for every 
a .  
Part (iii) of Observation 10 shows that we will have no problems if r 
is finite, and part (vi) shows that in this case the number of steps to be 
performed in the construction does not essentially exceed the number of 
conditionals in F. Part (vii) shows that rankr is a function assigning to every 
L0-sentence an ordinal. So ANrB iff rankr(A)_<rankr(B). We shall make use 
of this in the following. Parts (i) and (iv) make clear that this function is 
onto some initial segment {/3: f i<a} of the ordinals. All ranks are occupied. 
Parts (viii) and (ix) exhibit a similarity of the construction of an E-relation 
E(r) from a given set of premises F with the construction of E(~) from a 
given. E-base (B,_). In fact, the whole construction of Definition 11 may be 
viewed as the establishment of an E-base with B=Lo(F) and ~_ = <_rglBxB. 
The -~Ai's just help us to determine the relations between the Ai-+Bi's under 
minimalization. After these preparations, the following result will hardly be 
surprising. 
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Observat ion  11 Let F={Ai[2--~Bi:iEI} be a well-founded set of Lx-sen- 
fences. Then 
(i) E(F) is a well-ordering E-relation. 
fii) E(r) satisfies r, i.e., rc_g(E(r)). 
We see that what we have constructed is in fact an E-relation for F. To 
substantiate hat we reach our final aim, we need a further technicM lemma. 
Observat ion  12 Let F={Ai~--~Bi:iCI} be a well-founded set of Ll-sen- 
fences. Then for every Lo-sentence A, rankE(r)(A) = rankr(A). 
Now we can prove what we have been after in this section. 
Observat ion  13 Let F=(Aii:]-~Bi:iEI} be a well-founded set of Ll-sen- 
fences. Then for every E-relation ~_ satisfying F, E(r)E < or <=E(r). 
Coro l lary  For well-ordering E-relations <, E(K(<))=<_. 
7 The logic of E-minimality 
We propose to use Cnrs as the right consequence r lation for conditionals. 
Def in i t ion 13 Let F be a set of Ll-sentences and A an Ll-sentence. Then 
F~A, or equivalently AeCn(F), iffr~c~A. Furthermore, F~A iffr~c~A. 
Recall that we just instantiate here the scheme of preferential entailment in 
the sense of Makinson (1989; 1990), with the underlying preferential model 
structure being (E,~,V'E) where E is the set of all E-relations over L0 and 
and [-E are as determined in Definitions 4 and 10. We allow infinite sets 
of premises, which will often give rise to infinite ranks of epistemic entrench- 
ment. It is an effect of having done the whole thing for ordinals rather than 
for natural numbers that we can apply Cn to infinite sets of sentences. As 
usual, we may say that a set K of Ll-sentences i a theory or a belief set in 
L1 if K=Cn(K). 
In the welt-behaved M i.e., well-founded - -  cases, EE will perform in- 
teresting comparisons. But there are non-well-founded premise sets F whic~ 
do not permit well-ordering E-relations, for instance that of Example 4, viz., 
F={AiVAi+ID--*-~A~: i=1,2,3,.. .  }. In this case, F~A coincides with F~IA.  
On the other hand, recall that by the definition of V'E, if there is one well- 
ordering E-relation _ for F then we need not consider any E-relations for F 
that are not well-ordering, because < is v'E-preferred to all of these. More- 
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over, if F is well-founded we know that there are well-ordering E-relations 
for F and that there is a r-s-smallest among them, viz., E(F). So for a well- 
founded F, F~A iff E(F)~A, or in other words, Cn(F)=K(E(F)). It is no 
problem to determine the consequences of many suspicuous-looking infinite 
premise sets like .g. F= {AiVAi+l ~-+-~Ai+i: i=1,2,3,... }. 
Our consequence r lation accounts for the paradigm example presented 
in the introduction and Example 1 in a satisfactory and almost rivia~ way. 
If all we know is given by F={AVB}, then the unique Us-minimal E-relation 
for F is given by the E-base .L-4AVB-<T, which satisfies -~AD--~B. But if we 
then learn that A (and -~B) then all we know is F={AVB,A(,-~B)}, so the 
unique rs-minimal E-relation is given by _L-4AVB_~A(_~-~B)-4T which fails 
to satisfy -~AD--+B. That is, Cnr-~ in fact validates (3) and invalidates (4) 
mentioned in the discussion of Example 1. It is obvious but notable that Cn is 
nonmonotonic and allows the inference of conditionals from non-conditional 
knowledge bases. 
In Example 2, the second E-base is discarded, so we get for instance that 
F={A,B,-~AI::~B} entails the contraposed conditional -~BD--+A. 
Besides the performance of Cn in examples, its abstract properties are of 
interest. 19 
Observat ion 14 Cn satisfies 
5) Cno(r)nL  c_ Cn(r)r)L1 (Restricted Supraclassicality) 
5i) for all Lo-sentences A and B, FU{A)~-B iffF~A--,B (Restricted 
Deduction Theorem) 
5ii) P C Cn(F) (Inclusion) 
(iv) Cn(en(P)) = Cn(F) (Idempotence) 
(v) i f  I'CEC Cn(P) then Cn(E)C_ Cn(P) (Cut) 
(vi) if FCSC Cn(r) then Cn(r)C Cn(F~) (Cautious Monotony) 
(vii) izr:ccn(rl) ,  r,  ccn(r._l),  
r, ccn(r . )  then r,=r  for every i,j<<_n (Loop) 
Parts (iii)-(vi) mean that Cn is a cumulative inference relation in Makinson's 
sense. We point out that the restriction of Supraclassicality is severe. For 
example, if we have F~AI::~B and F~CEI-eD, we would certainly like to take 
over the classical step to F~(AD--~B)&(CD--~D), but this already transcends 
the bounds of the language L1. A similar estriction applies to the Deduction 
19The names of the conditions to be discussed are taken from Makinson(1989; 1990). 
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Theorem. In Part 2 of the present trilogy we sha~l extend LI in order to attain 
full Supraclassicality and give a treatment of negations and disjunctions of 
conditionals as well. 
Observation 14 shows where Cn behaves well. But there are also less 
mannerly features. 
Observation 15 Cn does not satisfy 





ifrU{A} B and rU{-,A} B then 
ifr B then ru{A} B or I'U{ A} B 
if {A,B}~=_L then Cn({A})U{B}~:_L 
Antecedent) 
(Proof by Cases) 
(Negation Rationality) 
(Consistency Preservation) 
that I should give an example that makes the case for at least one of 
these results. Let me explain how Disjunction in the Antecedent can fail. 
Example 5 We consider another restaurant example and assume now 
that there is a third restaurant which is run by Debbie. Let F={--AEI-~BVD, 
--BD--+AVD}. Now suppose you (only) know that either Annie's or Ben's 
restaurant is open. In this situation, F adds nothing new, since the informa- 
tion provided by 
If Annie's restaurant is not open (then) Ben's or Debbie's restaurant 
will be open. 
and 
If Ben's restaurant is not open (then) Annie's or Debbie's restaurant 
will be open. 
is already contained in the information provided by AVB. But suppose you 
(only) know that Annie's restaurant is open. In this case the first element in 
F, now read as 
If Annie's restaurant were not open (then) Ben's or Debbie's restau- 
rant would be open. 
does contain additional information. In particular, it seems justified to infer 
from I'u{A} the following conditional: 
if neither Annie's nor Ben's restaurant were open (then) Debbie's 
restaurant would be open. (5) 
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By an analogous argument, we can infer (5) from the premise set FU{B}. 
From FU{AVB}, on the other hand, we saw that we cannot get anything 
over and above the conclusions which can be drawn from {AVB} alone, so 
in particular we cannot get (5). 20 (End of example) 
The failure of Disjunction in the Antecedents and Proof by Cases is nei- 
ther very common or very uncommon in nonmonotonic logics. The failure 
of Negation Rationality which is common in nonmonotonic logics implies 
the failure of more non-Horn conditions for Cn (see Makinson 1990, Section 
IV.l). The failure of Consistency Preservation is perhaps the most striking 
deviation from usual patterns. In fact, the proof shows that for arbitrary 
independent L0-sentences A and B, Cn({A}) and Cn({B}) are not satisfiable 
simultaneously. This already indicates that the addition of new items of be- 
lief should not be performed by taking the logical expansion of the current 
theory, but by generating a new theory from the augmented premise set. 
Belief change based on Cn will be the topic of Part 3 of the trilogy. 
For reasons of language restriction, we cannot directly compare our logic 
with Lewis's "official" logic VC. With the plausible consistency condition for 
L2 
if < -~(Ac:~B) then < ~ AD--~B, 
however, we get the following translations of the prominent VC-axioms into 
robust inferences. We refer to the axiomatization f VC given by G£rdenfors 
(1988, Section 7.2). 
Observation 16 Let A,B,C range over Lo-sentences. Then the follow- 
ing sentence schemes of the form (Ao&...&A,~)--~B (n>_O), which are ax- 
ioms for VC, are translatable into valid robust inferences of the form 
{Ao, . . .  ,&}MB:  
5) A, for AeC o(.O) ;
(i!) ((A~-+B)&(A~-~C))~ (A~'-~B&C) ; 
5ii) AI::I---+T ; 
(iv) AD---~A ;
(v) (A~-', B) ~ (A~ B) ; 
(vi) (A&B)~ (A~-~B) ;
2°For details, see the proof of Observation 15(i). N Notice that the switch from indicative 
to subjunctive mood seems to produce some change in the meaning of the conditionals 
in question. Both types of conditionals (if they constitute any clear-cut ypes at all) are 
covered by our analysis. 
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(vii) ; 
(viii) ((A[:I--~B)&.(B[:~-+A)&(A[:~-*C)) ~ (BO--~C) ; 
(ix) (AvBo- C) ; 
(x) ((AD-~C)&-~(A[3--+'~B))~ (A&BE~-~C). 
Furthermore, the VC-rule "from B~C, to infer (AE~--~B)~(A~-*C)" is 
translatable into the valid robust inference 
(xi) if CECno(B) then A~--~B ~A[:]---~C. 
When pressed to name the most distinctive feature of naturM language con- 
ditionals as opposed to "conditionals" encountered in logic and mathematics, 
I think the best thing one can do is point out that natural anguage condi- 
tionals fail to satisfy some cherished inference patterns. There is a canon of 
three arguments which have become known as the counterfactual fallacies 
(see Lewis 1973, Section 1.8): 
Strengthening the Antecedent Transitivity Contraposition 
(SA) (Tr) (Cp) 
A~--~B AE~-~B A~--~B 
A&C~-+B BE~-~C --B[~-~--A 
AD--~C 
Most writers agree that these schemes axe not universally valid for condi- 
tionals. Yet here seem to be many contexts in which one may safely make 
use of them. The present logic accounts for this fact by construing condi- 
tionals in such a way that (SA), (Tr) and (Cp) are valid by default. That is, 
the relevant premises taken in isolation entail the respective conclusions, but 
the inference is not robust, since it can be spoilt by augmenting the premise 
set. We can give a precise description of the contexts in which the so-called 
counterfactual fallacies fail. 
Observation 17 
(i) {A[:]--~B)~A&C~-+B, butnot {At:~B)~A&CO--~B; 
{A~--~B, o--*C}~A[:~C, but not {Ao--~B, BEa--*C}~AD--*C; 
{A~--~B}~'.BO--*-.A, but not {AEy--~B}~'.BC~--~'.A. 
5i) In particular, {A~--~B, A~--~C}~=A~C~--~B; 
{AO--*B, BO--~C, BD--~-~A}~AD--~C; 
{A~-~B, B}~:~Bc>-*-,A. 
169 
(iii) For every E-relation <_, if< satisfies the premise but not the conclusion 
of (SA) then <_ satisfies A[:t--~-~C; if<_ satisfies the premises but not the 
conclusion of (Tr) then < satisfies B~-*--,A; if <- satisfies the premise 
but not the conclusion of (Cp) then <- satisfies B. 
Some comments are in order. In order to have a proper understanding of 
what is "counterfactual" in these inference schemes, we should introduce the 
appropriate terms in our setting. 
Def in i t ion 14 Let <- be an E-relation and A and B Lo-sentences. Then the 
conditional AsI--*B is called open (with respect o <_) if A<J_ and -,A<-_k; it 
is called (weakly) counterfactual (with respect o <) if _k<-~A and strongly 
counterfactual (with respect o <_) if .I.<-~A and _I_<-~B; it is called factual 
(with respect o <_) if _L<A; it is called even if type (with respect to <_) if 
_L<B. 
The positive parts of Observation 17(i), are, as they stand, about open con- 
ditionals. But it is easy to verify that they are extendable to counterfactual 
and strongly counterfactual conditionals, in the sense that the pertinent con- 
ditions of Definition 14 are added to the premise set. Note, however, the 
exceptional status of (Cp). If both the premise and the conclusion of (Cp) 
are to be counterfactual, then they are also even if type. If the premise is to be 
strongly counterfactual, then the conclusion is a factual even if conditional. 
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Observation 17 are more interesting. Considering 
the proof, we discover that (SA), (Tr) and (Cp) only fail if counterfactual 
conditionals are involved. As to (SA), the conclusion must be counterfactual; 
as to (Tr), the first premise and the conclusion must be counterfactual, and, 
by the same token, BD--+-~A is even if type; as to (Cp), again the conclusion 
must be counterfactual while the premise is even if type. So there is no failure 
of the "counterfactual fallacies" if all conditionals involved are open. This is 
what justifies the predicate 'counterfactual'. The predicate 'fallacy' is, as Part 
(i) of Observation 17 shows, not quite appropriate. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Observations 
Proof  of Observation 1 (i) The limiting case ~---A is immediate. 
So let ~/-,A; then, by the definition of *K=R(C(_<K)), an L0-sentence C
is in K*A iff it is in Cno((KM{B:--A<K--AVB})U{A}), i.e., iff A-+CE 
KA{B:--A<K--AvB}, i.e., by (E4), iff .I_<I<A--+C and --A<K--AV(A-+C), 
i.e., by the properties of E-relations, iff --A<K'-AVC, i.e., iff C is in 
{B: -A<K-~AVB}. 
(ii) By the definition of ___K, A_<KB iff A¢(KnK*~(a,~B)) or I-A&B. It re- 
mains to be shown that in the case where ~/A&B, A~K implies A~K*-~Av-~B. 
Now if A~K, then, by the G~denfors postulates for revisions of belief sets 
in L0, K*-,Av-~B=Cno(KU{"AV-'B}). But since belief sets are closed un- 
der Cn0, A6K is equivalent to A6Cn0(K), which in turn is equivalent to 
A6Cn0(KU{-~AV-~B}) = K*,Av,B, SO we are done. 
(iii) Immediate from the results in Ggrdenfors (1988, Section 3.6) and 
Ggrdenfors and Makinson (1988). t::l 
Proof  of Observation 2 Let <=E(-'<). Transitivity (El) is trivial - -  
For Entailment (E2), assume that 0#F -A. We have to show that B_<A for 
some BEF. Since classical propositional logic is compact, there is a finite 
lPoCF such that Po~-A. Now suppose for reductio that B~A for every BEF. 
Hence B~A for every BEFo, i.e., by the definition of E(__), there is a B-cut 
SB for every Bero such that SsI-B but SB~A. Consider U{Cno(SB): Bero}. 
Clearly, F0 is included in U{Cn0(SB): BEt0}. Since B-cuts are nested, the 
Cn0(Ss)'s are nested, so, since F0 is finite, U{Cno(Ss):BEFo} is identical 
with Cn0(SB) for some Bet0. For this B then, we have r0C_Cn0(SB) and 
Ss~/A. But this contradicts PokA. - -  For Maximality (E3), assume that B<A 
for every B. By definition, this means that for every B and every B-cut S, 
if BECn0(S) then AECn0(S). Choose B=T and S=0. This gives us kA, as 
desired. D 
Proof  of Observation 3 It is clear that (E2) for ~ is a necessary 
condition for E(__.)VIB xB=-<. For otherwise E(__.) could not be an E-relation, 
in contradiction to Observation 2. To show conversely that (E2) for ___ is 
sufficient, assume that __. satisfies (E2) over B. We have to show that for all 
A and B in B, A_B iff AECno(S) entails BECn0(S) for all B-cuts S. The 
direction from left to right follows immediately from the definition of a B-cut 
and the monotonicity of Cno. For the direction from right to left, assume 
that A~B. It remains to show that there is a B-cut S such that AECno(S) 
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but B~Cn0(S). Now consider SA=d~{CEB: A~C}. SA is a B-cut, since ~ is 
transitive. AESA, since ~ is reflexive, so SA~ and AECn0(SA). A tB  by 
assumption, so, since _ is transitive, C~B for every C in SA. Hence, by (E2) 
for -< over B, B~Cn0(SA), and we are done. [] 
Proof  of Observation 4 (i) Let F~IA, i.e., every E-relation satisfying F
satisfies A. This implies that every FE-minimal E-relation for some superset 
P. of F satisfies A, i.e., F~r-A. 
(ii) Let r cA. Assume that rV:IA, i.e., there is an E-relation _< which 
satisfies F without satisfying A. That is, re_K(<) and A~K(<). But by 
hypothesis, every ~ such that FC~ minimally implies A. So in particular 
every minimal E-relation for K(<) must satisfy A. But since < does not 
satisfy A, it cannot be minimal for K(_<). Therefore, the antecedent of (ii) is 
false. [] 
Proof  of Observation 5 (i)¢,(ii): We have to show that K(<)__CK(<') 
iff <~C<. As remarked above, L0-sentences A are satisfaction-equivalent to 
conditionals TD--*A, so K(_) and K(<') can be thought of as consisting of 
conditionals only. We have to show that for all Lo-sentences A and B, 
if-~A<-~AVB then -~A<'-~AVB, 
i.e., by the connectivity of E-relations, 
if not -,AVB<-~A then not -~AVB<~-~A, i.e., 
(*) if -,AVB_<'-~A then -~AVB<-~A, 
iff for all L0-sentences C and D, 
(**) if C_'D then C_<D. 
The direction from (**) to (*) is immediate. To see that the converse also 
holds, substitute -~(C&D) for A and C for B in (*). This gives us 
if -~-~(C&D)VC_<'-~-~(C&D) then -,(C&D)VC_<-~(C&D), 
i.e., by (E2), 
if C_<'C&D then C_<C&D. 
But since for every E-relation <:_~ C_<C&D is equivalent to C<:D~ the latter 
condition is equivalent to (**). 
(iii)~(ii): This is immediate from the connectivity of E-relations which gives 
us <=(L0xLo)-_< and <'=(L0xL0)-_<'. 
(iv)~=~(ii): That <C<'  implies -'--.CA' is clear from the definitions -=<M< -1 
and -'=_<'M(<') -1. To verify the converse, assume that <g<' ,  i.e., that there 
are Lo-sentences A and B such that A<B but not A<~B. By the properties 
of E- relations, this implies that A-'-A&B but not A-'A&B, so -g -~,  and 
we are done. [] 
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Proof  of Observat ion  6 By a number of Boolean transformations of
the definition of r-Ko. [] 
P roo f  of Observat ion 7 (i) As to conditionals, we show that for every 
B and C in Lo, 
-~BVC2;-,B iff -~BVC:~/~B for all i, i.e., 
-~BVC<-~B iff -,BVC<c~B for some i. 
But this immediate from the definition of _<. The case of Lo-seatences i
similar. 
(ii) Let _<* be as indicated. Then, just as before, for every B and C in L0, 
-,BVC_<*-,B iff -,BVC_<i-~B for some i. 
Substituting -~(D&E) for B and D for C gives us 
-,-,(D&E)VD_<*--~(D&E) iff -,-,(D&E)VD_<I-,'-(D&E) for some i, i.e., 
as all relations involved are E-relations, 
D_<*D&E iff D_<ID&E for some i. 
But again, since all relations involved are E-relations, this is equivalent to 
D_<*E iff D_<IE for some i, 
i.e., since D and E were chosen arbitrarily, _<* = _<IU... U_<,~ = _<, as desired. 
(iii) Clearly, any union of E-relations atisfies Entailment (E2) and Max- 
imality (E3). So <=<lU... is an E-relation iff it satisfies Transitivity 
(El), i.e., iff for all A,B,CELo, 
if B_<iC for some i and C_<iA for some j, then B_<kA for some k. 
By a simple Boolean transformation, we see that this is violated iff A<iB_<iC 
for some i and C_<iA<jB for some j, and A<kB for every k, as desired. [] 
P roo f  of Observat ion  8 Let _<EK_<q From Observation 5 we know 
that this is equivalent to <~C<. 
We first show by transfinite induction on a that for any ordinal a, 
-(_<) * ' :0  ' = 9 = 0  . 
. c~+l(_<')C_~+l(_<): The induction hypothesis is ~(<:')C_~(_<) for every 
/~<a+l.  So in particular ~(_<')C_a(_<)C_a+l(_<). As a+l(_<') = a(_<t)U 
a(_<'), it remains to show that a(<:')C_a+l(~): 
= 
= {BELo-~(_< ) :B<'C for every CEL0-c~(_< )} = 
= ({BcLo-~(_<:'): B_<'C for every CELo-~(_<')} N ~(_<)) U 
({BCLo-c~(<_): B<'C for every CeLo-c~(< )} M Lo-~(<)) C_ 
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C_ ~(<) U {BE(Lo-~(<-'))n(Lo-~(<-)):B<-IC for every CELo-~(<-I)} C 
(by the induction hypothesis) 
C_ ~(<:) U {BELo-~(<-):B<-'C for every CeLo-N(<)} c_ (by <-'c_<-) 
E ~(<:) U {BELo-~(<:) :B<-C for every CELo-~(<-)} = 
: u 
= ~+I(_). 
• ~(_<')_C~(<_) for limit ordinals c~: The induction hypothesis fl(<__')C_fl(_<) 
for every flKa. But since ~(<') = U {fl(<-'):~Ka} = U {fl+l(_<'):fl<a}, and 
similarly for <_, we get the claim immediately from the induction hypothesis. 
Having shown that for any ordinal ~, ~(<')c_~(_<), we can rerun the argu- 
ment establishing a(<_')C_c~+l(_<), this time for any ordinal a. But this just 
means that for every L0-sentence A, if rank<l=a then rank_< -a, and we are 
done. [] 
Proof  of the Corol lary Immediate from the Observation and the fact 
GEE<_' and <:'EE<- implies <=<1. rn 
Proof  of Observation 9 Let <_EE_<q If also __.l_E~,<, then, by the 
antisymmetry of E~., <-=<', so <-EK, <' is trivial. Now consider the principal 
case where _<'G~.<-. By Observation 8, this gives us <'GK<_. Hence either 
<F-K_<' or <- and <-' are incomparable with respect o EK. In the former case, 
_<EKo_<' is immediate. In the latter case, we have to show the Ko(<-)_CK0(<-'). 
But this just means that Lo-O(<-)C_Lo-O(<_') which is entailed by _<EE_<'. [] 
Proof  of Observation 10 (i) As Cno is monotonic, Cn0(q)) is included 
in A~ for every a. A~+1 = Cno({Aj~B/:--B/eA~}) C_Cno({-,B/:-,BjeA~}) 
C_ Cno(A~) = A~, since A~ is closed under Cno. 
* -  < ~-  (ii) By definition, a(_)=U{fl(I '):f l<a} U{A#-A~+I:fl<a}. We show 
by transfinite induction that the latter set equals Lo-A~. 
a=O: U{A#-Ae+I: 8<0} = ~ = Lo-Ao. 
a+l :  U{Az-A~+I: f l<a+l} = (U{A~-A#+I: fl<a}) U (A,,-A~+I) = (by in- 
duction hypothesis)(Lo-A~)-(A~-A~+~)= Lo-A~+~. 
Limit ordinals a: U{A;-A#+I:~<a } = (by set theory) U{U{A:,-Av+v 
7<fl}:fl<a} = (by induction hypothesis) U{Lo-A#:fl<a} = L0-A{A#: 
fl<a} = (by definition) Lo-A~,. 
(iii) Let I'={A~cy~B~: icI} be finite and consistent, and let _ be an E- 
relation for r. Now assume for reductio that there is a non-empty JC_I such 
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that {-~Aj:jEJ} is contained in Cn0({Aj~Bj:jEJ}). Observe that J is finite. 
So {Aj~Bj:jEJ}t-&:{-~Aj:jEJ}, where &{--Aj:jEJ} is the conjunction of 
the elements of {--Aj:jEJ}. Thus, by (E2), Ak~Sk<&{--Aj:jEJ}<-~Ak for 
some k in J. That is -~Aky~Ak-*Bk, but this means that _< does not satisfy 
AkI::~BkEF, contradicting our assumption that < is an E-relation for F. 
For the following, assume that F is well-founded. 
(iv) Let a be such that &~CA~+I. Hence, by (i), A~=A~+I. By defini- 
tion then, A~+I = Cn0({Aj--*Bj:-~AjEA~}) = Cn0({Aj--+Bj:--AjEA~+I}). 
Set J={jEI:-~AjEA~,+I}. Then {--Aj:jEJ} = {-~A~:-,AjEA~+I} C A~+I 
= Cno({Aj~Bj:--AjEA~+I}) = Cn0({Aj~Bj:jEJ}). Hence, by the well- 
foundedness of F, J={jEI:~AjEA~+I}=0. That is, since A~=A~,+I, 
{jEI:-~AjEA~}=~}, i.e., by definition, A~+l=Cn0(0), hence, by A~=A~+l 
again, A~=Cn0(0). 
(v) The first part of (v) follows immediately from (i). For the second 
part, suppose that {Ai--~Bi: ~AiEA~+~} = {AI---,B~: -AiEA~}. So, by defi- 
nition, A~+2 = A~+~, hence, by (iv), A~+I=Cn(0). Since we presuppose that 
all conditionals with antecedents A such that t-'~A have been deleted from 
F in advance, it follows that {Ai---*Bi:--AiEA~+I} = {3, so by supposition 
{Ai~Bi:-,AiEA~} = 0. 
(vi) F rom (v), we know that  - 
#0, unless {Ai~Bi:-~AIE/k~}=0. That is, each step in the construction pro- 
cess reduces the number of conditionals to be taken i to account by at 
least one. Let ~ be the smallest cardinal that is greater than the cardinal 
number of F. Since there is no bijective mapping between fl and r, then 
{A~B~:-,AiEA~}={~, so A~+~=Cn(0). Hence the set of ordinals 7<~+1 
such that A,=Cn(0) is non-empty. Let a be the smallest ordinal of that set. 
Then, by definition, TEa(F)=Cno(0). In particular, let F be finite and [F]=n; 
then [{A~--~Bi: ~A~EA0}[=n, and hence, since each step in the construction 
reduces the number of conditionals to be taken into account by at least one, 
[{Ai---,Bi:-~AiEA~}[ = 0. Thus A,~+I = Cn0({Ai--*Bi:--AiEA~}) = Cn0(0), 
i.e., TEa(F) for some a<n+l .  
(vii) If AECno(~}), then AEa(F) if and only if a is the smallest ordinal such 
that A~=Cn0(~}), which exists, as shown above. If A¢Cno(q)), then AeA~ for 
those a such that A~=Cn0(0). So the set of all ordinals fl such that A~Az 
is non-empty. Let 7 be the smallest ordinal of that set. "7 cannot be 0, for 
Ao=Lo; -y cannot be a limit ordinal for if A~A~ for a limit ordinal 0' then, 
by the construction of A.¢, there must be a 9'~<7 such t at A~A~,; so 9' is 
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a successor number. So AEA~_I-A.y, i.e., AET-I(F). To show uniqueness, 
suppose for reductio that Aea(r)  and Ae#(r) with a<~. From Aea(r) ,  it 
follows that A~A~+I, hence, since A#__A~+I, A~A#, contradicting Ae#(r). 
(viii) Let AeA~ and A<rB. From AeA~, we get that Ae#(P) for some 
~_>a, and from A_<cB we then get that for some 7___fl_>a, 
hence, by (i), BeA~. So A~ is an L0-cut with respect o _<r. To show that 
the A~'s are the only non-empty cuts with respect o _<r, suppose that S#0 
is a cut with respect o _<r. Consider the set of ordinals ~ such that there 
is an AeS with Aefl(F), and take the smallest ordinal a from this class. We 
show that A~=S. Select some AeS with Aea(F). Since S is a cut, BeLo is 
in S iff A_<rB, i.e., iff BeE(r) for some #>_a, i.e., iff BeU{#(r): #_>a}=ao, 
by (vii) and (ii). 
(ix) From left to right: Let A_<cB and AeA~. From the latter, we get 
that Ae#(r) for some ~_>a, then the former gives us that Bey(r) for some 
7>_fl_>a, hence BEA, C_A~, as desired. From right to left: Let A~rB, i.e., 
by (vii), there are ~ and V such that Ae#(r), Bey(r) and v<#. But then, 
ACA# and B~A.y+ID/k#, so A, but not B is in A#, and we are done. o 
Proof of Observation 11 (i) That E(F) satisfies Transitivity (El) 
follows immediately from the transitivity of _< on the ordinals. 
For Entailment (E2), suppose that 0~E~-A Consider the set of ordinals fl 
such that there is a BeE with rankr(B)=fl, take the smallest ordinal a from 
this class and select some BeE with rankr(B)=a. Now since for all CeE, 
rankr(C)>_a, they are in A~ for some 7___a, hence, by part (i) of Observation 
10, each CeE is in A~, so EC_A~. But A~ is closed under Cno by definition. 
Hence AeA~, hence AeV(F) for some 7_>a, hence B_<rA. 
For Maximality (E3), suppose that B_<rA for all B. That is, rankr(B)_< 
rankr(A) for all B, so in particular ankr(-l-)_<rankr(A). Let a=rankr(T). 
Then, by part (vi) of Observation 10, A~=eno(0), and we have A#=Cno(0) 
for fl>a, so, since rankr(A)_>a, AeCn0(0). 
To show that E(F) is well-ordering, let E be a non-empty set of Lo- 
sentences. Consider the set {a: rankr(A)=a for some ACE}, select the 
smallest ordinal fl from that set and a BeE such that rankr(B)=fl. Since 
~_<rankr(A) for all AcE, B_<rA for M1 AEE, so B is a smallest element in 
E, and we are done. 
(ii) Suppose for reductio that there is an AiO-+BiEF which _<r 
does not satisfy. Then Ai--.B~_<:r-~Ai, i.e., rankr(Ai-~B~)_<rankr(-,Ai). Let 
rankr(-,Ai)=a, i.e., -,AieA~-A~+I. As -~AieAa, we get, by definition, 
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Ai - ,B iEA~+I  -- Cn0({A j~Bj :~A jEA~}) .  So rankr(Ai-~Bi) _ a+l  > 
rankr(-~Ai), and we have a contradiction. [] 
P roo f  of Observat ion  12 Let rankE(r)(A)-a, i.e., by definition AEL0-  
a(_<r) and A_<rB for every BEL0-a(_ r ) .  By  part (ii) of Observation i0, 
this means that AEA~ and A_<FB for every BEZX~. Thus, by part (ix) of 
Observation I0, AEA~ and for every fl and BE/ks, if AEA~ then BEA~.  But 
we know from parts (i) and (iv) of Observation i0 that a(r) is non-empty, 
i.e., that there is a BEA~-A~+I .  So A~A~+I ,  so AEa(F) ,  so rankr(A)=a. [] 
P roo f  of Observat ion  13 Let i? be as indicated and < an E-relation 
satisfying F. If -< is not well-ordering, then E(F )FE< by definition, since 
E(F) is well-ordering by Observation 11. So let < be well-ordering. As _E is 
antisymmetrical, it suffices to show that E(F)_E_<. We show that for every 
L0-sentence A, rankE(r)(A)_<rank<(A) by transfinite induction on rank< (A). 
Let, as induction hypothesis, rankv.(r)(A)<rank<(A) be established for 
all A with rank<(A)<a. Now let rank<(C)=a. We have to verify that 
rank~.(r)(C)_<a, i.e., by Observation 12, rankr(C)<a, i.e., ceu{z(r): Z<a} 
= L0-A~+I, by part (ii) of Observation 10. 
Suppose for reductio that CEA~+I, i.e., by construction, CECno{Ai--~Bi: 
--A~EA~}. Since -< is an E-relation, so by (E2), A~---~B~<C for some i 
such that -~A~EA~. As < satisfies F, we have -~Ai<Ai~Bi, so by (El), 
-~Ai<C. Hence, rank<(-~A~)<rank<(C)=a. But --A~EA~, so rankE(r)(-~Ai) 
= rankr(-~A~) >_ a > rank< (~A~), which contradicts the induction hypothe- 
sis. [] 
Proof  of the Corol lary First we recall that any set of sentences satisfied 
by a well-ordering E-relation ~ is well-founded, so in particular K(<) is well- 
founded and the construction of E(K(-<)) yields a well-ordering E-relation, 
by Observation ll(i). In view of Observation 13 and the antisymmetry of
_CE, it suffices to show that <_EE(K(_)). 
We show that rank<(A)<rankE(K(<))(A) for every A by induction 
on rank<(A). Let, as induction hypothesis, rank< (A) _<rankE(K(<)) (A) be 
established for every A with rank_<(A)<a. Now let rank<(A)--a. For 
a=O, the claim is trivial. For a>0, choose representatives BZ with 
rank<(Bz)=fl for all ~<a (such B~'s exist!). Now clearly B~<A for 
all fl<a, hence < satisfies -~AV-~Bzb-*A for all fl<a. By Observa- 
tion ll(ii), E(K(<)) satisfies K(<), so E(K(<)) satisfies in particular 
-~AV--Bz~--~A for every fl<a, so BZ-<K(<)A for every fl<a, so by indue- 
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tion hypothesis fl=rank<Bz_<rankE(K(<))B~<rankE(K(<))A for every fl<a, so 
rank< (A)=a<rankE(K(<))A. 
Proof of Observation 14 (i) Let AECn0(F)ML1. As Cn0 does not 
operate on the internal structure of conditionals, they may be regarded as 
atoms when applying Cn0 to F. Note that since F is an Ll-set, these new 
atoms do not appear in any complex sentence. Therefore, if A is a conditional, 
i.e., if A is in L1-Lo, it can only be a Cno-consequence of F if AEF, and the 
claim reduces to Inclusion which will be proved as (iii). On the other hazid, 
if A is in L0, then, by the sazne argument, it must be a Cn0-consequence of 
FML0. But as Ko(<) is a Cn0-theory for every E-relation _<, every E-relation 
satisfying FDFMLo satisfies Cn0(FML0), so every E-relation for F satisfies A. 
(ii) Let BeLonCn(rU{A}). As BEE0, this means that BEK0(E(Fu{A})) 
-= Cn0(L0(rO{A})), by construction. But this is equivalent o A- ,Be 
Cno(L0(r)) = Ko(E(r)), i.e., A- BECn(r). 
(iii)-(v) Immediate from the general results of Makinson (1989; 1990) for 
arbitrary preferential model structures. 
(vi) As Makinson points out, it suffices to show that (E,~,CE) is "stop- 
pered" in the sense that for all E-relations <:EE and all Ll-premise sets F, 
if <~Y then there is a </such that either <~EE< or <1=<, and <~ satis- 
fies Y v'E-minimally. Let < ~F. In the first case, assume that there are only 
non-well-ordering E-relations for Y. Then we are immediately done, since, 
by the definition of V'E, non-well-ordering E-relations are incomparable with 
respect o V'E, so <1=< will do. So assume, as the second case, that there 
is a well-ordering E-relation for P. So F is well-founded. Hence E(F) is the 
smallest E-relation with respect o F-E, so <1=E(F) will do. 
(vii) Drawing again on Makinson's work, we only have to verify that I- E 
is transitive. But this follows trivially from the definition of v-E. D 
Proof of Observation 15 By giving counterexamples. 
(i) Let F={--Ao-~BVD, --Bo--+AVD}; the <-translations are A<AVBVD 
and B<AVBVD. E(FU{A}) has the E-base _I_-~A-~AVBVD-~T, E(FU{B}) 
has the E-base A_-~B-~AVBVD-~T; in both cases, it follows that 
AVB<AVBVD, so both ru{A} and ru{B} entail -~(AVB)o-*D (-C). 
But E(FU{AVB}) has the E-base _I_-~AVB-~T which does not give 
AVB<AVBVD, so PU{AVB} does not entail -~(AVB)O-~D. 
(ii) Let r--{-~C, AVCO--~D, -~AvCc~-*D}; the <-translations are 
.I_<--C, -~A&--C<(--A&-~C)VD and A&--C<(A&--C)VD. E(FU{A}) has 
the E-base ±-<A__--C~D~(A~--C)VD-<T, E(FU{--A}) has the E-base 
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±-~--A_~--C~_D-~(--A&-~C)VD-~'I-; in both cases, it follows that ~C<'-CVD, 
so both ru{A} and FU{--A} entail Co--~D (=B). But E(F) has the E-base 
2--~--C__D-~'Y which does not give "-C<-~CVD, so F does not entail CD-+D. 
(iii) Let F={C, D, -,Do--~C, -,AV'-CO--~C, AV--CD--*C}; the <- 
translations are _L<C, 2-<D, D<CVD, A<C and --A<C. E(F) has the E-base 
2--~C_D-~CVD-~'Y, so F entails -,Co--*D (_--B). But E(Fu{A}) has the E- 
base _I_-~A_~D-~C_~CVD-~T, and E(Fu{~A}) has the E-base 2--~-~A-~D-~C- ~ 
CVD-~T, so neither gives C<CVD, so neither FU{A} nor FU{--A} entails 
-~CG--*D. 
(iv) Let r is consistent and has the E-base 
2_-~A-~C-~ T. Cn( { A } ) is the set of all sentences satisfied by E( { A } ) which has 
the E-base 2_--~A-~T. Now --AV--CO--*A C Cn({A}). So both -,AV-~CO--*A 
and --AV-~CG-*C (--B) are in Cn({A})U{--AV-~Co-*C}. But there is no 
E-r.elation satisfying these two sentences, for the first one translates to A<C 
while the second one translates to C<A which contradicts the definition of 
< from _<. [] 
Proof of Observation 16 We restrict our attention to the principal 
cases with antecedents he negations of which are not in Cn0(0); the limiting 
cases are all trivial. In view of Observation 4, we can replace ~ by ~1. 
(i) ~IA for AELoACn0(0): _I_<T-A for such an A and every E-relation 
_<, by (E3). 
(ii) {Ao--*B, Ac:I--*C}~IAO--~(B&C): Let < satisfy the premises, i.e., 
-~A<-~AVB and --A<-~AVC. By (E2) then, --AVB<AV(B&C) or --AVC< 
AV(B&C), so, by (El) and (E2), -~A<-~AV(B&C), i.e., _<~IAG--*(B&C). 
(iii) ~xAO--~T: like (i), --A<--AVT is immediate, provided that "-A6 
Cn0(0). 
(iv) ~Ao-- ,A:  like (i), --A<--AVA is immediate, provided that 
(v) {Ao--~B)}~IA~B: Let _< satisfy the premise, i.e.,--A<--AVB. Thus 
_I__<~A<--AVB, so 2_<A---,B, i.e., <_~A~B. 
(vi) {A&B}~IAD--+B: Let < satisfy the premise, i.e., .L<A&B. Then, by 
(E2), -~A<2_<A&B<-~AVB, so ~Ao-~B.  
(vii) {AO--~--A}~IBo-~-~A: Immediate, since there is no < satisfying 
Ao--,--A which would mean --A<'-AV--A, a contradiction with (E2). 
(viii) {AO--~B, BO--*A, Ao--~C}~IBO--~C: Let < satisfy the premises, 
i.e., -,A<--AVB, --B<--BVA, and --A<--AVC. The first term implies, with 
the help of (E2), that --B<--A. Also by (E2), either -~BVA<'~BVC or 
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-~AVC_<-~BVC. In the former case, we get -~B<-~BVA<-~BVC, in the lat- 
ter case we get -~B<-~A<-~AVC<-~BVC, so in any case <~BD--~C. 
(ix) {AD--rC, BG--*C}~IAVBD--~C: Let < satisfy the premises, i.e., -~A< 
-~AVC and -~B<-~BVC. By (E2), either -~AVC<(-~A&-~B)VC or -~BVC< 
(-~A&-~B)VC. In the former case, ~A&~B<~A<~AVC<(",A&~B)VC, in 
the latter case similarly -~A&-~B<-~B<-~BVC<(-~A&-~B)VC, so in any case 
<[=(AVB)Et-~C. 
(x) {AD-+C, -~(AEr-e-~B)}~IA&BD-eC: Let < satisfy the premises, so 
-~A<-~AVC and, by the consistency condition f r L~, "~AV-~B<-~A. Hence, 
by (El) and (E2), -~AV-~B<-~A<-~AVC<(-~AV'~B)VC, so <~(A&B)D-eC. 
(xi) If CCCno(B) then At:3--eB~AD-+C: Let CCCn0(B) and let < satisfy 
the premise, i.e., "~A<-~AVB. Since CeCn0(B), also -~AVCECno('~AVB), so, 
by (E2), -~AVB<-~AVC, hence -~A<-~AVC, i.e., <~AD--~C. [] 
Proof  of Observation 17 (i) We show the positive claims concerning 
~; the negative claims concerning ~ follow from (ii). The E-relations E(P) 





Clearly, for these E-relations it holds that -~AV-~C<-~AV-~CVB, -~A<-~AvC, 
and B<-~AVB, respectively. So they satisfy the desired conclusions. 
(ii) The E-relations E(F) generated by the augmented premise sets have 
the following E-bases: 
-I--<-~AVB ~--~AV-~ C--< T ,  
_I_-<-~A__.-~BV C-.<-~AVB ~ T, 
_I_--<B-< T ,respectively. 
It is easy to see that ]?or these E-relations it holds that -~AV-~CVB<-~AV-~C, 
-~AVC<-~A, and -~AVB<B, respectively. So they do not satisfy the desired 
conclusions. 
(iii) Let in the following < satisfy the premise(s) but not the conclusion of 
our inference patterns. 
In the case of (SA), we have ~A<-~AVB<-~AV-~CVB<-~AV-~C, so < satis- 
fies A~-~-.C. 
In the case of (Tr), we have, first, --A<--AVB, secondly, -~B<--BVC, and 
thirdly, -~AVC<-~A. From (E2), we know that either -~AVB<-~AVC or 
-~BVC_<-~AVC. But the former cannot be, since it would imply, with the help 
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of the first and third condition, -~A<-,A. So -,BVC<--AVC. But by the sec- 
ond and the third condition and by (E2) this gives us the chain --B<--BVC< 
-,AVC_<~A_<--BV--A, so _< satisfies B[:]--~-,A. 
In the case of (Cp), we have _I_<--A<-~AVB_<B, so< satisfies B. [] 
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